When You Don't Report: Enforcement, Penalties, and Personal Liability Under Swiss and EU Cyber Law


Part 2 of 3 - This post covers what happens in practice when an organisation fails to notify, reports late, or reports incompletely - across each of the five regimes: ISG/ISA, FINMA, the Swiss FADP, NIS2, and DORA.
The question of what happens when an organisation does not report a cyber incident is no longer abstract in Switzerland. The sanctions regime under the ISG/ISA became enforceable on 1 October 2025. The FDPIC has published explicit guidance on what "as soon as possible" means for data breach notification. FINMA's enforcement toolkit has been deployed in practice. And the Akira ransomware campaign - approximately 200 Swiss companies affected between 2023 and 2025, joint federal press release from OAG, fedpol, and NCSC in October 2025 - showed the scale of what that regime now has to deal with.
Each enforcement mechanism deserves separate treatment, because the legal basis, the sanctions, and the process differ. One theme, though, runs through the Swiss regimes and tends to get underweighted in compliance discussions. In Switzerland, the fine falls on the individual, not the company, and the missed notification alone does not trigger it.
ISG/ISA: Sanctions for Critical Infrastructure Operators
The obligation derives from the revised Federal Act on Information Security (ISG/ISA), implemented through the Cybersecurity Ordinance (CSV), with sanctions enforceable since 1 October 2025. The report is due within 24 hours of discovery and must be completed within 14 days. Missing a deadline is not yet punishable.
The enforcement path has three steps:
The NCSC (now BACS) contacts the organisation and sets a deadline to report
If that deadline passes without result, it issues a formal order with a second deadline and an explicit reference to the penalty
Only wilful non-compliance with that order is punishable
The sanction is a criminal fine of up to CHF 100,000, and it targets the responsible natural person. In practice, the executive or officer accountable for the reporting obligation pays it, and senior managers can also be liable for failing to supervise. Negligence is not punishable. The company itself can be fined only when the fine does not exceed CHF 20,000 and identifying the individual would require disproportionate effort.
The NCSC receives reports but does not impose sanctions itself. When its order is ignored, it files a criminal complaint with the competent cantonal prosecution authority, which decides on the fine. As noted in Part 1, the 24-hour report can be forwarded to FINMA only if it arrives on time, and the full 72-hour report still goes to FINMA separately.
FINMA Supervisory Enforcement
FINMA does not fine anyone itself. Its toolkit under FINMASA and Circular 2023/1 is administrative - and for a supervised institution, more consequential than any fixed monetary penalty:
Supervisory proceedings, potentially public
Binding remediation orders
An independent auditor or investigating agent appointed at the institution's cost
Conditions on the licence, up to and including withdrawal
Publication of enforcement decisions - the naming mechanism carries real market consequences
Personal industry bans on responsible executives
All of this can be triggered by a failure to notify FINMA without delay of a significant ICT or cyber incident, including deliberate downgrading of severity to stay under the reporting threshold. The outsourcing clock from Part 1 is worth repeating, because institutions most often get it wrong. For outsourced functions, the notification window starts when the provider becomes aware, not when the bank is informed. A bank waiting for its supplier to brief it before notifying FINMA may already be late. Deadlines count bank working days only, but severe attacks must be reported within 24 hours even on weekends and holidays.
FINMASA also contains criminal provisions, prosecuted by the Federal Department of Finance rather than FINMA. Two of them matter for incident reporting: giving FINMA false information, punishable by up to three years' custodial sentence and, even when negligent, by a fine of up to CHF 250,000; and wilfully ignoring a FINMA ruling issued under threat of penalty, with a fine of up to CHF 100,000.
FINMA typically learns about unreported incidents through its supervisory channels, cross-authority information sharing with the NCSC or FDPIC, third-party disclosures, or the media, so an unreported incident is unlikely to stay invisible for long.
Swiss FADP Criminal Provisions
Article 24 nDSG/FADP creates the notification obligation, but it does not attach a sanction to it. The FDPIC confirms in its own guidance that failing to notify is not a criminal offence. The fines of up to CHF 250,000 under Articles 60 to 63 are prosecuted by the cantons and directed at the responsible natural person. The company can be fined, up to CHF 50,000, only when identifying the individual would take disproportionate effort.
In practice, the triggers are narrow. A controller who fails to notify the FDPIC "as soon as possible" is not punished for that alone. The FDPIC can order the notification after the fact, and the fine applies if that order is wilfully ignored. A processor who fails to notify the controller is not punishable either. Direct criminal exposure comes from obstructing an FDPIC investigation or giving it false information, and from wilfully ignoring the minimum data security requirements.
Negligent violations do not attract the fine at all, but FDPIC administrative proceedings still apply and binding orders may follow. The legislator chose individual criminal liability on purpose, to change how executives personally engage with data protection governance.
NIS2: Fines and Management Liability
For Swiss groups with EU subsidiaries qualifying as essential or important entities, NIS2 non-compliance is enforced by the national competent authority of the member state where the entity is registered - there is no single unified EU authority. The failure modes track the reporting cascade from Part 1: missing the 24-hour early warning, the 72-hour incident notification, or the one-month final report. Late, incomplete, or absent reporting is non-compliance regardless of whether the incident caused actual harm.
The fines are two-tier: up to EUR 10 million or 2% of global annual turnover for essential entities, EUR 7 million or 1.4% for important entities, whichever is higher. For Swiss groups this matters, because the turnover base is the worldwide turnover of the group the entity belongs to, and not only that of the EU entity.
And the personal dimension is there too. Article 20 NIS2 makes management bodies responsible for approving and overseeing cybersecurity measures, and liable for infringements. For essential entities, authorities can go further and ask for a temporary ban on the CEO or legal representative exercising managerial functions. How far this turns into personal fines depends on each member state's transposition.
As the table in Part 1 shows, the mandatory 72-hour step under NIS2 is the incident notification, counted from awareness. The intermediate report proper, foreseen by Article 23, is a separate, later step, required only upon request of the CSIRT or competent authority.
DORA - Intermediate Report and Sanctions
DORA takes the opposite position. The technical standard on reporting timelines makes the intermediate report unconditionally mandatory: due within 72 hours of the initial notification - not of detection - even where the status or the handling of the incident have not changed. There is no exception for "nothing new to report". An entity that skips the update because the incident is still unresolved is in breach.
The practical implication for incident response procedures: a calendar trigger at T+72h from the initial notification, regardless of incident status and, for banks, regardless of weekends, with a defined owner responsible for submitting the update.
For context, FINMA sits somewhere in between. Its 24h/72h pattern - pre-orientation, then full notification via the EHP platform - is followed by a new report within 72 hours whenever new developments or assessments arise, and by a final root-cause report. The update is mandatory, but only when there is something new to report. For dual-regulated groups, DORA's post-notification obligations are structurally the more demanding of the two, not just the front-end timeline.
On sanctions, DORA leaves the penalty levels to the member states, but requires national competent authorities - including the ECB via the SSM for eurozone banks - to have binding orders, pecuniary measures and public censure at their disposal, and allows them to extend penalties to members of the management body. For critical ICT third-party providers designated under Article 31, the Lead Overseer can impose penalty payments of up to 1% of average daily global turnover, for up to six months. That last power targets the cloud and software providers the financial sector depends on.
The Boardroom Question
The pattern across the five regimes is consistent. The ISG/ISA fines the responsible individual, once an NCSC order has been ignored. The FADP fines the responsible individual - criminally - for ignoring the FDPIC or misleading it, not for the late report itself. FINMASA punishes false information given to FINMA even when negligent, and FINMA can ban executives from the industry. NIS2 makes management bodies accountable, and DORA lets member states extend penalties to them. All five regimes can attach personal consequences to the notification decision, directly or through the authority's orders.
This makes two things essential for every senior person involved in that decision:
The authority to decide quickly - governance structures that require multiple sign-offs before a report can be filed increase the liability exposure of the individuals involved
The documented record to defend the decision later - who decided what, on what information, and when
This is the same design principle that closed Part 1, now seen from the liability side. When a regulator asks "who decided not to notify, and when?", the answer must be in a log.
Penalty Cross-Reference
Regime | Max penalty | Sanction type | Who bears it |
FINMA (FINMASA; Circ. 2023/1; Guidance 05/2020 and 03/2024) | Licence withdrawal; under FINMASA, up to 3 years' custodial sentence (false information) or CHF 100,000 (ignoring a ruling) | Binding orders; investigating agent at the institution's cost; published rulings; industry bans; FINMASA offences prosecuted by the FDF | Institution + accountable executives |
ISG/ISA + CSV | CHF 100,000 | Criminal fine for intentionally ignoring an NCSC order after two deadlines; cantonal prosecution | Responsible individual; company up to CHF 20,000 (subsidiary) |
Swiss FADP (Art. 24; Art. 60-64) | CHF 250,000 | No direct sanction for non-notification; criminal fine for ignoring an FDPIC order (Art. 63) or obstructing an investigation (Art. 60(2)); intent only; cantonal prosecution | Responsible individual; company up to CHF 50,000 (subsidiary) |
NIS2 (essential entities) | EUR 10M or 2% of global turnover | Administrative fines; management accountability (Art. 20); temporary management bans (Art. 32) | Entity + management (varies by member state) |
DORA | Set by member states for financial entities; 1% of average daily worldwide turnover per day for critical ICT providers | Orders; pecuniary measures; public notices; periodic penalty payments for critical ICT providers | Entity; management body where national law provides |
Note on the intermediate report: under NIS2, the mandatory 72h step is the incident notification, counted from awareness; the intermediate report under Article 23 is required only upon request of the authority. Under DORA, the 72h intermediate report is unconditionally mandatory and counted from the submission of the initial notification, not from detection - even where the status of the incident has not changed. For dual-regulated entities, DORA's obligation governs operationally.
Next in this series: Part 3 covers the operating model - how to design a single incident response lifecycle that feeds all of these reporting tracks in parallel, what each phase must produce and when, and two detailed scenarios from the past twelve months.
Sources:
ISG/ISA (SR 128), Art. 74a-74h; Cybersecurity Ordinance (CSV, SR 128.51)
Riccardo Resta
Security Engineer LinkedIn




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